Abstract: This paper examines two different approaches to judicial protection of entitlements in international economic law. One of them, 'performance-oriented', is applied by WTO adjudicators. Performance-oriented remedies focus on inducing wrongdoers to resume compliance with the underlying substantive rules. The other, 'reparation-oriented', is applied overwhelmingly in international investment law. Reparation-oriented remedies aim at offsetting the injury caused to private parties by the wrongful conduct. This paper discusses the utility of performance-oriented remedies within WTO law, and assesses the possibilities for otherwise reparation-oriented investment tribunals to have recourse to these remedies. It examines a number of decisions that, it is argued, favor performance over pecuniary compensation. From the viewpoint of the state found in breach, compensation then appears as a threatened sanction for non-compliance with the performance obligations determined.
Introduction
This paper examines two different approaches to judicial protection of entitlements in international economic law. One of them, 'performance-oriented', is that applied by adjudicators at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Performance-oriented remedies focus on inducing the wrongdoer to resume compliance with the underlying substantive rules. The other, 'reparation-oriented', is applied overwhelmingly in international investment law. Reparation-oriented remedies aim at offsetting the injury caused to private parties by the wrongful conduct. In international investment law, the main instruments employed for this purpose are awards for the payment of financial compensation.
It has often been argued that the WTO should adopt retrospective remedies, and panels and the Appellate Body should be empowered to order wrongdoers to pay compensation for breach.
1 This paper examines the opposite question: the possibilities for otherwise reparation-oriented investment tribunals to have recourse to performanceoriented remedies. This does not mean abandoning financial compensation, but recognizing that the ultimate purpose of investment law, as stated in the preamble to the 2012 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, is to 'promote greater economic cooperation', and to 'maximize effective utilization of economic resources and improve living standards', by establishing 'a stable framework for investment'.
The paper proceeds in three sections. Section 2 discusses the traditional investment law remedy of financial compensation and the alternative of remedies aimed at compliance, arguing that, despite the attention received by the 'last resort' of authorized retaliation, WTO remedies induce compliance by intervening within a process of persuasion more than by effectively leading to economic sanctions. Section 3 examines the use, in international investment law, of remedies and techniques aimed at inducing compliance rather than awarding damages. Section 4 Concludes.
The retrospective portion of consequences is provided for in ARSIWA Article 31, which requires the responsible state to 'make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act'. Reparation may take three different forms: restitutio in integrum, with the restoration of the situation prior to the breach; financial compensation, covering any financially assessable damage that restitution cannot redress; and satisfaction, a category that encompasses a variety of symbolic measures whose unifying factor is the public recognition of the breach as such.
(a) Reparation-oriented remedies in investment law
The remedy of reparation, and in particular that of pecuniary compensation, has always been prevalent in international investment law. This may be attributed to two main The second phase, known as the implementation phase, is known for the possibility that the injured party (in this case, a WTO Member) may adopt measures of retaliation ('suspension of concessions and other obligations') against the offender. Retaliation measures may only be taken in case the violation persists, and only at a level equivalent to that of the injury ('nullification or impairment') produced by the breach. For this reason, two further procedures must generally be followed before retaliation is authorized.
The first procedure is a compliance panel under DSU Article 21.5, responsible for solving any 'disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a [WTO] agreement of measures taken to comply' with the original rulings. Once the issue of (non-)compliance is settled, the injured Member may request an authorization for retaliation, specifying the level that it believes is equivalent to the injury produced by the breach. However, the offender may object (and always has objected) to the level of retaliation chosen, as well as to the choice of concessions and obligations made by the injured party. In this case, DSU Article 22.6 allows it to request an arbitration to determine the permissible type and level of retaliation. Only after these procedures does the WTO finally authorize retaliation.
(b) WTO remedies and compliance
While the WTO is sometimes celebrated for its 'teeth', the adjudication and implementation phases may take a few years to complete. The process seems almost designed to create procedural obstacles for the authorization for retaliation, delaying the moment at which members may finally retaliate. Compliance proceedings have been labelled 'a cost-free opportunity to delay compliance for several months', 7 a 'delaying tactic employed by only in nine disputes, always after arbitrators had determined its permissible level and kind.
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Since both the compliance panel and the authorization for retaliation may be requested freely by the complainant, leading automatically to the a panel report or an authorization, the fact that over 80% of panel reports never gave way to subsequent stages of adjudication (although there is in principle no temporal limit for this to occur) is significant. While it does not mean that compliance was achieved, it means that the injured party has reached some sort of understanding with the offender on the matter. Only 6% of disputes adjudicated upon ever reach the retaliation stage. In many cases, authorized retaliation is never implemented.
The conclusion to be drawn is that, in spite of its apparent potential to 'rebalance the scales', allowing the injured party to withdraw concessions from an offender, WTO retaliation is only very rarely implemented by WTO Members. This is largely because it does not provide them with any concrete reparation for injury. Retaliating Members are not made 'better off' by retaliation; they are only interested in applying it to the extent it may function as yet another instrument to press for performance. Retaliation thus fulfils an essential function as a measure of last resort, available to the organization in case the wrongdoer does not comply with the initial ruling. With a number of advantages, compensation can be used to the same effect.
(c) Adopting a performance-oriented approach in investment arbitration
The goal of employing a more performance-oriented logic in investment arbitration does not require the abandonment or weakening of investors' right to monetary compensation for legal breaches. The essence of the performance-oriented approach is in considering this remedy as a ultima ratio -the last option at the disposal of the tribunal to deal with a recalcitrant state -rather than the sole weapon in its arsenal. The first response of tribunals may instead be to demand from states found in breach performance, with the resumption of the investment relationship on lawful grounds.
The performance-oriented approach presents a number of advantages and few disadvantages. It gives the host state an opportunity to perform its obligations knowing precisely what these are, and conscious of the liability that it may incur if it does not comply.
Perhaps more so than in WTO adjudication, the prospect of having to pay a large price for the breach may empower sectors of government that prefer compliance over those that favor insisting on the breach, and possibly sway public opinion in this direction. From the viewpoint of investors, performance-oriented remedies provide them with an instrument to obtain a negotiated settlement; a genuine agreement may be more profitable than an award for damages. The latter may be difficult to enforce, and even voluntary payment is likely to leave the host state ill-disposed towards the investor in the future. From the broader viewpoint of the objectives of investment law, allowing time for agreements ensures that investment law is given a chance to exercise its ultimate purpose: ensuring respect for the rights of investors and contributing to the economic development of the host country.
The performance-oriented approach does not require a modification of the remedies employed in international investment law, but merely a strategic use by the tribunal of these remedies. Rather than delivering a single decision at the end of the procedure, the tribunal may issue preliminary decisions that, without determining the outcome of the case, clarify issues of law and of legal interpretation. Even in its final award, the tribunal may propose solutions different from the mere payment of damages. A relevant practice in fact exists on this matter.
Performance-Oriented remedies in international investment law
Investment tribunals have generally adopted performance-oriented remedies of two kinds. The first kind involves a decision prior to the final award, anticipating the possible results of the dispute and providing parties with the opportunity of complying with substantive rules rather than incurring responsibility. The second type of performanceoriented remedy takes place when the final award itself allows host states a choice between performance (often framed as restitutio in integrum) and the payment of damages. no international claim would arise. Rather than concluding from this that the case should be terminated, however, the Tribunal instituted a genuine mechanism for compliance control, establishing for the parties a duty to report to the Tribunal on compliance every six months.
(a) Performance-oriented partial decisions
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BIVAC v Paraguay also involved the claim that the non-performance of a contract constituted a breach of the standard of fair and equitable treatment. The ICSID Arbitral Tribunal held that, because the Courts of Asunción had exclusive jurisdiction over the contract, the treaty claim would not be admissible if, through proceedings before the domestic courts, BIVAC were able to vindicate its rights. 20 Like in SGS v Philippines, the Tribunal then stayed its proceedings and provided BIVAC with three months to pursue a claim before the local courts.
Adopting a 'supervisory function', the Tribunal 'directed' the parties to 'report to the Tribunal, separately or jointly, on the status of those proceedings at intervals of six months'. 21 Interestingly, the Tribunal went even further than that of SGS v Philippines in establishing a number of conditions, to be followed both by the Paraguayan government and by its courts, in order to 'deal[] fairly with the claims' of BIVAC. 22 In so doing, it indicated clearly the conditions under which performance could be achieved, avoiding the incidence of responsibility.
(b) Performance-oriented final decisions
Most international investment arbitrators conclude their awards by granting reparation in the form of damages. Under general international law, however, monetary compensation is a substitute for the preferred remedy of restitution. As famously defined in Chorzów Factory, 'reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed'.
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The practical difficulties with restitution, and the infringement it represents on state sovereignty, have often been invoked -including in Chorzów Factory -to justify reparation by equivalent. 24 A few tribunals, however, have devised mechanisms for offering states the opportunity of providing restitution and avoiding the incidence of reparation. The judgment was initially successful in inducing the parties to agree on a path towards compliance. Three months after it was issued, the parties reached an agreement whereby Burundi would reimburse the claimants' company for taxes collected unlawfully due to the company's status of a free zone company. The agreement also established a convention for the operation of the company, to be 'ratified' by ICSID. Disputes regarding compliance with the agreement and convention, both incorporated into the judgment, were submitted to the jurisdiction of ICSID Arbitral Tribunals. 
Conclusion
The ability of arbitrators to order pecuniary compensation that can be enforced in a number of jurisdictions is certainly one of the major strengths of international investment law.
However, awarding damages to investors is not the sole option available to tribunals.
In this regard, due consideration must be given to the swift administration of justice;
performance-oriented remedies should not be used as a means to unduly extend the duration of the proceedings. However, in many cases Tribunals may be able to positively influence the prospects of agreement, both by the choice of remedies and by the means of delivering them.
Especially when there is a realistic prospect that lawful relations between investor and host state may be restored, tribunals may find that alternatives exist that more adequately fulfil the objective of promoting economic cooperation and providing investors with a stable framework. 
